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Abstract
Proposers strategically formulate legislative bills before voting takes place. However, spa-
tial voting models that estimate legislator’s ideological preferences do not explicitly consider
this fact. In our model, proposers determine the ideology and valence of legislative bills
to maximize their objective functions. Approaching to the median legislator ideology and
increasing costly valence increases the passing probability, but usually decreases the pro-
poser’s payoff. Using quantile utility proposer preferences, the model becomes tractable and
estimable. In this way, we deal with the bill sample selection problem to estimate legisla-
tor’s preferences and also, the ideology of proposers, the proposed valence change, and the
ideological stance of the statu quo in a common scale. Using Chilean Senate 2009 - 2011 roll
call data, our results suggests that (1) political party affiliation significantly affects Senators’
ideology, (2) popular, young and male Senators are more extremist, and (3) proposers during
Bachelet and Pin˜era’s terms have similar ideologies.
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1 Introduction
Bill proposers typically choose the content of proposals to obtain legislators’ support.
Proposers jointly consider several variables to have a bill passed, including the current statu
quo, the distribution of political forces in the Congress, and the institutional setup. In this
paper, we provide a simple and estimable model of the legislative process, in which strategic
proposers select bills’ characteristics considering their effects on the voting behavior of
legislators.
We essentially merge in a tractable model a simple agenda-setting process with a spa-
tial legislative voting setup. We explicitly incorporate a strategic bill proposing stage to
appropriately estimate the ideological preferences considering the proposer’s endogenous
choice of bills. Upon some parametric assumptions, our model provides a richer analysis
of the legislative process in comparison to alternative setups.
Formal models of law-making represent legislators’ preferences and bills in a multidi-
mensional space of attributes. However, when estimating models, the related literature
implicitly assumes that bills actually put for legislators’ consideration are just randomly
drawn from an unspecified set of possible proposals. A sensible model should consider that
the observed legislative voting process takes place after the proposer strategically selects
bills. Following Peress (forthcoming), in a typical one-dimensional setting as ours, there
may exist a gridlock or even a censoring interval for a given proposal. In reality, a strategic
proposer avoids presenting an bill with slim chances of passing. Thus, as researchers, we
never consider how legislators vote for the unobserved bill when estimating models of leg-
islative behavior. Hence, observed bills are a subset of potential proposals with relatively
high likelihood of approval, as suggested by Clinton and Meirowitz (2001). Heckman (1976)
pioneered the analysis of statistical models under non-random sample selection. However,
unlike classical applications in labor economics, we do not observe characteristics of never
proposed bills, so that Heckman’s approach is unfeasible. Instead, the law-making process
is a sample selection mechanism on its own. Integrating it into the process would make it
possible to estimate legislators’ preferences and other features characterizing the legislative
process.
The basic setup of our model is similar to classic spatial voting models (Poole and
Rosenthal 1985, 1997, Londregan 2000a, Poole 2005) which ignore sample selection con-
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siderations.1 Our setup includes a strategic proposal stage implying additional constraints
that allow us to recover proposal and statu quo locations, and to provide a more fleshed
setup of the legislative process. The legislators and the proposer have preferences on the
ideological spatial location (left or right) of the bill and on its valence. The latter con-
cept has been primarily used in electoral models as a representation of candidate-specific
characteristics, such as charisma or competence, that appeal to all voters (see Gilligan and
Krehbiel 1987, 1990, and Groseclose 2001). In our paper, valence measures the quality of
a proposal which represents universally desirable goals of legislation such as coherence and
efficiency cost-effectiveness. Thus, our interpretation of valence is closer to the ones used
by Londregan (2000b) and Hirsch and Shotts (2011).
Most of the previous literature has assumed that valence is exogenously given (with
the exception of Hirsch and Shotts 2011). Londregan (2000b) discusses the strategic use of
valence by the executive power, but in his empirical estimations, he considers the valence as
a fixed attribute of the proposer. Arguably, in real legislative process valence is endogenous.
The proposer, either the executive power or a group of legislators, strategically exerts
effort to increase the valence and the likelihood of approval, considering costs and benefits
involved. Moreover, in developing countries the executive power is able to provide more
valence to bills than legislators because of its advantage in term of resources and capabilities
(Londregan 2000b).
Formally, the legislative game consists of two stages. First, a proposer defines the
proposal’s ideological stance and the valence with two potentially conflicting goals: to
make it as close as possible to his own ideological position, and to increase the probability
that the bill gets approved. By generating sufficient valence, the proposer may make the
Congress to approve bills that are distant from the median voter ideology. At the second
stage, the legislators vote to accept or to reject the proposal. In the latter case, the statu
quo policy remains.
While sensible, this approach is untractable if we use standard expected utility (Von
Neumann-Morgensten) preferences because the probability of passing a bill roughly requires
2V1 calculations, where V stands for the number of voters. However, if the proposer has a
different kind of preferences, focusing on quantiles of possible outcomes instead of expected
1A large literature devoted its attention to the estimation of spatial voting models for the US Congress.
More recent work has focus on the Supreme Court (Martin and Quinn 2006; Peress 2009), and Latin
American chambers Londregan (2000a, 2000b); Desposato 2006
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values (Manski 1988; Rostek 2010), the model becomes tractable. While this approach may
sound too sophisticated, it is indeed much simpler than expected utility because it delivers
a surprisingly easy problem to solve for a proposer: he only needs to maximize his own
preference under a median voter approval restriction with a fixed probability. The solution
of the model transpires into a simple non-linear model of dichotomic dependent variable
(probit if we assume Gaussian idiosyncratic taste shocks) that can be easily estimated in
canned statistical software such as Stata with little programming. We provide conditions
under which the parameters of model are identified and compute bootstrapped standard
errors since final estimates involve non linear transformations on the parameters of the
model so that it is hard to derive an asymptotic variance matrix.
One important issue on the model identification is the impossibility of recovering ide-
ological positioning of all the usual parameters of interest, i.e. the ideology of preferences
and voted bills (Rivers 2003). We go beyond putting some restrictions or normalizations to
secure identification by using an index parametrization strategy as in Londregan (2000a).
This allows us to economize in the degrees of freedom, but also to obtain evidence on the
determination of legislator preferences, importance of bills, and the statu quo. For the sake
of comparison, we also pursue the usual approach of estimating fixed ideological preferred
points of legislators.
We take the model to the data using roll-call data from the Chilean Senate during
March 2009-March 2011. The data covers the last year of M. Bachelet and the first one
of S. Pin˜era. In our approach, ideological preferred points of legislators depend on the
political party affiliation, but also on individual factors such as age, gender, educational
level, as well as in political career variables: previous experience, voting percentage in
last election, and electoral district represented. We advocate a construction of a statu quo
ideological index using previous voting record and public opinion approval of the President
of the Republic. Among potential proposers we distinguish bills promoted by the Executive
power, and those sponsored by the Senate, by the Representative chamber, or by a joint
Committee of the Congress chambers.
Our results show that political party affiliation is the most relevant determinant of
Senators’ ideologies. By using our parameterization of indices, we find evidence of greater
extremism in male, young, and highly voted Senators, especially for the Center-right.
We also estimate fixed ideological effects for each Senator, with reasonable precision of
bootstrapped confidence intervals. Nevertheless, our preferred parameterized approach
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provides some novel insights of the ideology stance of Senators.
The results for the median voter, statu quoand proposer’s ideology taking together
suggest that the ideological scenario between Bachelet’s and Pin˜era’s periods did not change
by much. The evidence could be interpreted in the way suggested by certain rightists
Senators: Pin˜era’s government has been quite close to the ideological stance of Center-left
parties. The model’s measurement of differential valence generated by proposers decreases
after Pin˜era takes office, which may be attributed to the difficulties the first center-right
government in 20 years, or to the great 8.8 Richter earthquake in central Chile occurred
12 days before Pin˜era’s government started. Finally, our measurement of the ideological
evolution of the statu quo suggests that Senate support for the previous bill moves the statu
quo to the left during Bachelet’s term, but has a less clear effect during Pin˜era’s term. This
finding is in line with the evidence on ideological preferences of proposers during the last
period.
Our road map is the following: in the next section we present the model. In Section ??
we consider its estimation. In Section 4 we present the empirical findings. Finally, Section
5 concludes.
2 Model
In our setting, we assume that each proposal can be described as a combination of two char-
acteristics: an ideological position, typically a left-right political position; and a proposal
quality component known as valence. Londregan (2000a), Rivers (2003) and Clinton, Jack-
man, and Rivers (2004) point out that the traditional spatial model voting in the political
science literature is unidentified. Since in these models there are two relevant dimensions
per proposal, ideology and valence, it is generally impossible to learn whether a proposal
is preferred due to a high valence, or because it strongly confronts extremist ideological
positions. Londregan (2000b) uses these insights to analyze voting data from the Chilean
Congress Committees.
However, in spite of the advances made by these works, an unappealing implicit assump-
tion in Londregan’s estimating procedure is that proposals put for voting are randomly
drawn from a possible universe of them, or that every proposer will blindly advocate bills
regardless of their possibility of approval. It is common sense that professional politicians
assess the likelihood of approval of any proposal before putting it for others’ scrutiny. This
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means that: (i) the data on actual proposals is actually a non random sample of possible
proposals and, consequently, the estimators relying on the aforementioned assumptions are
biased; and (ii) we can use proposers’ behavior, as well as voting behavior, to learn about
legislator’s preferences and other influencing factors.
Hence, the executive power in particular, and any proposer in general, wants to max-
imize two potentially conflicted dimensions of a proposal: (i) closeness to a preferred ide-
ological point and (ii) probability of passing the proposal. We assume that the executive
power or other proposers perfectly know the legislators preferred ideological points.
Consider that a proposer i, who can be either a legislator or the executive power,
optimally determines the ideological content of a proposal zp and its valence qp. Since
every legislator likes a higher valence, the proposer can make every proposal approved if
he provides a sufficiently high valence. Therefore, an interesting model must include some
force that prevents proposers from generate arbitrarily large valence. On the other hand, it
is reasonably to assume that a higher technical level of the proposal demands more effort,
time and monetary resources. Providing valence is costly.
Preferences over proposals are represented by a utility function Upxv, zp, qpq where xv is
the ideological preferred point of the legislator or proposer v, zp is the ideological position
of the proposal and qp is the valence of the proposal. For instance, a well-known utility
function is quadratic
Upxv, zp, qpq  αqp 
1
2
pzp  xvq
2
2.1 A Traditional Approach
In this setup, the proposer deals with uncertainty in the way considered by the classic
Von Neumann-Morgensten preferences. Simply put, the objective of the proposer i is to
maximize the expected value of his proposal. Therefore the proposer i sets zp and qp to
solve
max
zp,qp
tUpxi, zp, qpqP pX, zp, qp, zs, qsq   Upxi, zs, qsqp1 P pX, zp, qp, zs, qsqq  Cpqpqu
where Cpqpq is an increasing, weakly convex cost function of providing valence; zs, qs are
the ideological position and valence of the statu quo; and P pX, zp, qpq is the probability of
approval of the proposal which depends on the vector of ideological preferred points of all
committee members X  px1, x2, ..., xV q and on the proposals characteristics pzp, qpq.
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A problem with the previous specification is that the probability of the proposal passes
P pX, zp, qp, zs, qsq is a mathematical object which is very hard to compute. The fact that
the individual-voter probability of approval varies across legislators is the greatest compli-
cation.2 To see the complexity, we elaborate this probability further.
P pX, zp, qp, zs, qsq  P pV ayeq   P pV  1 aye, 1 nayq   ...  P

V   1
2
aye,
V  1
2
nay



V
¹
v1
Fv  
V¸
k11
p1 Fk1q
V
¹
vk1
Fv  
V¸
k11
V¸
k2k1
p1 Fk1qp1 Fk2q
V
¹
vk1,k2
Fv   ...
 
V¸
k11
...
V¸
kV1
2
k1,...,kV3
2
p1 Fk1q ...

1 FkV1
2
	
V
¹
vk1,k2,...,kV 1
2
Fv
where F is the cumulative distribution of the idiosyncratic shock. Computing the above
formula rapidly increases in complexity as the number of voters grows. Roughly, this
probability computation involves considering RpV q 
°M
m1
 
V
M

 2V1 (with M  V 1
2
if V is odd and M  V
2
  1 if even) possible configurations of voting, quite a daunting
task for a realistic number of voters of congressmen. For instance, in the case of the
Chilean Senate, there are V  38 so that M  20. Then, R  1.374  1011. Moreover,
since RpV  1q  2RpV q, the application of this approach quickly becomes impractical for a
lifelike number of legislators or voters. Perhaps more importantly, we may call into question
a decision-making process that implies such a burden of calculations. The setup implies
that the proposer considers every single possible configuration of voting behaviors and
fully understands how her own actions affect such configurations. On the other hand, our
intention is to provide a tractable, easily implementable, yet richer voting model. A more
convenient setup, that preserves the basic insights we have discussed so far, is presented
next.
2.2 A more tractable setup
Instead of relying on the traditional Von NeumannMorgenstern expected utility theory
of decision making, we propose a different kind of preferences that provides a much more
2Notice that if we assume that the proposer does not know the preferred ideological points would make
our problem easier. However, in this setting seems unlikely because legislators have a well-known political
affiliation.
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tractable model in this case. It also describes a simpler and probably more realistic decision-
making process of the bill proponent, which is the maximization of a particular quantile of
the expected utility conditional on a particular median voter. This kind of behavior entails
loss risk aversion defined by the level of targeted quantile in the distribution. Proponents
who are willing reduce the risk of loss, target a higher quantile by modifying their choices
accordingly. A complete treatment of this general theory could be found in Rostek (2010)
with an ancestor in Manski (1988).
Our setup assumes that the proposer already knows who the median voter is before
deciding on the ideology and valence of the bill. Since the proposer cares about a quantile
and the distribution of the utility, the specific ranking is irrelevant to the decision as
long as the median voter remains unchanged. In this setting, the proposer avoids the
complex calculation of the approval probability of the bill. He only needs to compute
the probability of that the median voter approves, a much simpler object. Instead of
considering all possible rankings, the proposer determines a pair pqp, zpq, that maximizes
a quantile a of the expected utility random variable. In other words, the proposer ensures
an ex ante probability of approval a given the valence costs, its preferred ideology xi, and
the preferred ideology of the pivotal legislator, xm.
Since the problem is static, we do not use time subscripts t although the statu quo
pqs, zsq or even the the ideological preferences xv may change over time. The proposer
maximizes the quantile a, Qa of the utility
max
zp,qp
tQa pIrUmpzp, qpq ¥ Umpzs, qsq|xmsUipzp, qpq   IrUmpzp, qpq   Umpzs, qsqsUipzs, qsq  Cpqpqqu
where F is the cumulative distribution of the idiosyncratic shock of the median voter. This
problem can is equivalent to
max
zp,qp¥0
tapUipzp, qpq  Uipzs, qsqq   Uipzs, qsq  Cpqpqu
subject to Umpzp, qpq  Umpzs, qsq ¥ F
1
paq
In particular, if we choose the traditional spatial linear-quadratic utility function (as in
Londregan 2000a) and a linear cost function, we solve a Lagrangian to characterize the
proposer’s behavior
Lpzp, qpq 
"
a

αpqp  qsq  
1
2
 
pzs  xiq
2
 pzp  xiq
2



 γqp
  λ

F1paq  αpqp  qsq 
1
2
 
pzp  xmq
2
 pzs  xmq
2

*
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From the first-order conditions, the solution pzp , q

p q necessarily satisfies the following con-
ditions
zp  aηxi   p1 aηqxm with η  α{γ (1)
qp  qs  
1
α

F1paq 
1
2
 
pzs  xmq
2
 pzp  xmq
2



(2)
A well-defined maximum is defined whenever 0   aη   1.
A legislator v  1, 2, ..., V approves the proposal if Uvpzp, qpq  Uvpzs, qsq ¡ ǫv. If we
replace the proposal zp and valence q

p , we find the voter v votes aye if
αpqp  qsq  
1
2
 
pzs  xvq
2
 pzp  xvq
2

¡ ǫv,t
F1paq   pzp  zsqpxv  xmq ¡ ǫv,t
F1paq   pxv  xmqpaηxi   p1 aηqxm  zpq ¡ ǫv,t
where the second step follows from substituting (2) into the previous equation. Since it is
hard to identify the parameter η, we set it to the value of 1. Therefore, if we consider that
idiosyncratic shocks follow a standard normal distribution, the probability of the voter
approves a particular bill is
Pvpxi, xm, zs, qsq  Φ
 
Φ1paq   pxv  xmqpaxi   p1 aqxm  zpq

 Φ py   pxv  xmqpΦpyqxi   p1 Φpyqqxm  zpqq
2.3 Taking the model to the data
Essentially, xv for v  1, ..., V are individual fixed effects in a non-linear model in the usual
jargon of panel data econometrics. Without loss of generality, we denote these parameters
by a linear index of observed variables xv 
°K
k1 ξklk,v  ξlv. In the particular case of
individual fixed effects K  V and the variables l1, ..., lV are dichotomic variables taking 1
for voter k and 0 otherwise. However, following the insight of Londregan (2000a), we could
also use a more economic parametrization by modeling individual preferences in terms
of observable voters’ characteristics, such as political party, age, gender, etc. Since this
strategy allows us to a substantial reduction of the parameters to estimate, it is likely to
improve our mean squared error in finite samples. Given this setup, the ideological point
of the median or pivotal voter is medpxvq  xm  ξlm.
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Proposer’s preferences xi and time-varying statu quo zs could be parameterized sim-
ilarly. Hence, xi  ϕri and zs,t  πst. Finally, we could also try to parameterize the
probability of winning, which should depend on characteristics of the bill voted. In this
case, since the probability has to be bounded between 0 and 1, we rather model the quantile
of the distribution, i.e Φ1paq  y  δut. We also have to restrict the product aη  Φpyqη
to be bounded between 0 and 1. One simple way to do this is by substituting constraining
η  1.
Using all this nomenclature, we could write the complete likelihood in terms of the
non-linear index θitvpw, βq with witv  plv, ri, st, utq as the vector of observable variables
and β  pξ, ϕ, π, δ, ψq as the vector of parameters.
θitvpwitv, βq  δut   ξlv  xm pΦpδutqpϕri  xmq   ξlm  πstq (3)
L 
I¸
i1
V¸
v1
T¸
t1
tditv log Φpθitvpwitv, βqq   p1 ditvq log Φpθitvpwitv, βqqu (4)
where ditv is a dummy variable with value 1 whether the voter approves the bill, and 0
otherwise. As econometricians, we ignore who the pivotal voter considered by the proposer
is. Since the median voter identity depends on the ideological points of all other legislators,
we consider the possibility of changing the pivotal when the Senate composition changes,
after a new election on roughly one-half of the Senatorial districts. This is the situation
in our data. Jointly with the (first-round) Presidential election in December 2009, half
of Senatorial districts also had elections. Consequently the composition of the Senate
modified and the pivotal voter potentially changed.
For the Chilean data for 2009 and 2010, the proposers considered are the Executive
Power, the Senate, and the Representatives Chamber under the composition 2009- March
2010 (Bachelet’s term) and under the composition from March 2010 onwards (Pin˜era’s
term).
3 Identification
The structure of the model shows that there is no natural scale for ideological preferences,
nor natural ideological direction of preferences, as stated by Rivers (2003). In order to
achieve identification, one usually needs to normalize certain parameters of the model.
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Rivers (2003) shows that in a one-dimensional setting, two independently linear constraints
are needed to achieve identification. In our model we choose to constrain the standard
deviation of the idiosyncratic shock to 1 (as any other probit model) and to normalize the
median voter to an arbitrary value. The latter requires to normalize constants of the linear
indices of our model.
The basic equation describing approval or rejection of a bill can be written as
Pvpxi, xm, zs, qsq  Φ py   pxv  xmqpΦpyqpxi  xmq  pzs  xmqqq
which depends on three linear indices xvxm, xixm, and zsxm. Since xm is constant for
a legislative period (or for a period with an invariant composition of legislators), it is just
a constant in these indices that can be set to an arbitrary value. This is true without loss
of generality since there is no natural metric for the space of ideological preferences. Then,
after estimating xv as a linear combination of relevant legislator’s characteristics (with no
constant term), the value of the index can be adjusted by adding a constant A so that the
index median coincides with our arbitrary value xm. Hence if the median of our estimated
preferences is m˜, then we need the following relation medpξlv   Aq  m˜   A  xm. The
latter clearly implies that A  xm  m˜.
The situation becomes subtler when there are two or more legislative terms, each one
with a potentially different median voter, as it happens in our sample. We handle this
case by computing the median voter value for the second period after normalizing the
median voter ideology of the first term to x1m. Hence, the constant A is computed using
the following logic
medpξl1v   Aq  m˜
1
  A  x1m ñ A  x
1
m  m˜
1
where m˜1 is the median value of the index for the first legislative period. We need to add
the same constant to the index of the second legislative term since preferences are period-
invariant. Thus, we have that medpξl2v Aq  m˜
2
 A  x2m. Therefore, A  x
2
mm˜
2. The
addition of the same constant to the indices in both periods implies that x2m  x
1
mm˜
1
 m˜2.
To be consistent, the median voter of the second term is constrained to be x2m. Note that
we implicitly constraint the median value for other terms by imposing an arbitrary value
for the median of the first term.
Once the constant terms of the indices are normalized as explained above, the rest of
the identification analysis consists in showing that the parameters of the model can be
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uniquely determined given data characteristics and an infinite sample size. Rothenberg
(1971) shows that a model is point-identified if the information matrix of the joint density
of the observations is of complete rank. Since our model is essentially a probit model with
a non-linear index, the information matrix in this case is
Irβs  E

B
2L
BβBβ 1


¸
i
¸
t
¸
v
E

φpθitvq
2
ΦpθitvqΦpθitvq
Bθitv
Bβ
Bθitv
Bβ 1

If the quadratic form Bθitv
Bβ
Bθitv
Bβ1
is a positive-definite matrix, Rothenberg’s condition is met.
The latter is guaranteed if the index gradient vector contains linearly independent items.
Hence Rothenberg’s result is useful because it shows that lack of identification will generate
a singular information/Hessian matrix and no maximum likelihood estimator exists. If we
can obtain a non-singular Hessian, the model must be point-identified.
An additional problem arises when the number of voters V is relatively large with
respect to T , the number of elections. We face what is called the “incidental parameter”
problem. Intuitively speaking, it is hard to accurately estimate a large number of individual
ideological fixed effects while we have a reduced number of observations per legislator. The
problem is even exacerbated when statu quo estimates (equivalent to time fixed effects)
are also requested, as the traditional approach demands Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers
(2004)). We believe this viewpoint is simply unrealistic: the incidental parameter problem
essentially tells us that there is a trade-off between the amount of information we can
learn from the data and its precision. In our view, the current approach advocates a
nearly useless agnostic solution. With a tighter parametrization in the spirit of Londregan
(2000a), and introducing sample selection considerations proposing behavior, our approach
delivers more than do the agnostic traditional setup. In order to see the consequences of a
largely parameterized model, we estimate a model with legislator fixed effects and compare
the results to more succinctly parameterized models.
4 Data
4.1 Senator’s information
We build a database of the Chilean Senate voting with data from March 2009 until March
2011. In December 2009, half of the Senators were elected or reelected in an election that
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took place at the same time of the Presidential3 Thus, there are two periods with different
Senate composition: March 2009 - March 2010 (until the 11th) and March 2010 (since the
12th) until March 2011. We usually refer to the first term as Bachelet’s term , and the
second one as Pin˜era’s term. We collect data of 870 legislative elections (476/394) elections
during the period.
It is important to consider two terms in our analysis since the composition of the Senate
substantially changed in March 2010. The Senate is composed by 38 members in each term.
We have 49 listed in our data because eleven Senators in office during Bachelet’s term
were not reelected, or did not run for the reelection (Arancibia, Romero, Flores, Mun˜oz
R., Zald´ıvar Ad., Gazmuri, Naranjo, Nu´n˜ez, Ominami, A´vila and Va´squez). During the
second legislative term, new Senators arrive: Chahua´n, Pe´rez L., Rinco´n, Walker I., Walker
P., Zald´ıvar An., Allende, Rossi, Lagos, Quintana and Tuma. In January 16th 2011, four
right-wing Senators quitted to be appointed as Secretaries (Ministers) by President Pin˜era
(Allamand, Chadwick, Longueira, and Matthei). This changed the Senate composition
again, even though there Senators were replaced by legislators from the same parties. The
new appointed Senators (Larra´ın, C., Garc´ıa-Huidobro, Von Baer, and Uriarte) are not
included in our estimations.
Tables 1 and 2 show the voting records of all the Senators during the two periods,
grouped by political parties. Albeit Democratic Independent Union (UDI) and National
Renovation (RN) form the coalition of the President during the second period, it is not clear
that their voting records tend to reject bills during Bachelet’s term and to approve them
during Pin˜era’s term. By the same token, political parties forming the main opposition
Concertacio´n por la Democracia (Christian Democrat Party (PDC), Socialist Party (PS),
Party for Democracy (PPD) and Social Democrat Radical Party (PRSD)) do not exhibit
a clearly different opposite voting behavior. These facts suggests that there is some kind
of previous negotiation about the content of the bills, or that the valence dimension of the
proposals tend to minimize ideological disagreement.
In theory, our dependent variable for individual voting is approving (yea) or rejection
(nay). However, in practice, there is a larger set of outcomes. For instance, a Senator may
have chosen not to vote (abstinence), or he/she may have been absent. Yet other possibility
3Senators’ term is eight years, but half of them are elected at a time. In November 2013, there will
be a new Senatorial election for those who stay in office since 2005. At the same time, there will be a
Presidential election for the period 2014-18.
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may have been a “pareo” (matching) agreement, that is, a pact by which political adver-
saries avoid voting once the other is absent for some anticipated justified reason. Finally,
some of them could not vote since they were not Senators by the time some proposals were
voted. All these features are shown in Tables 1 and 2. Since approval conditional in voting
is very high, it makes more sense to consider abstention and absenteeism as another kind
of “nay”.
Tables 3 and 4 exhibit the main characteristics of Senators. There are only five female
Senators in the whole sample (Matthei, L. Perez, Alvear, Rinco´n and Allende). The
Senators average age when initially took office is 58.5. Almost all of them have a college
degree education or higher, and 17 of them hold some graduate diploma such as a Master
or PhD. Given the binomial election system prevailing in Chile, senators may have gotten
the first, second or even the third majority in their circumscription.
4.2 Chilean Senate Legislative Procedure
Legislative bills can be proposed by the President or by a group of congressmen. The law
establishes that bills on certain subjects must exclusively been proposed by the President,
including budgetary issues. It is well-known that the 1980 Constitution in Chile establishes
a strong presidential system, in which the President has remarkable influence over the
legislative process.
A bill must be initially presented to the Senate or to the chamber of Representatives.
The initial chamber is named the original one. The other chamber becomes the bill re-
viewer. Bills on certain subjects (budget, public administration, etc.) must necessarily be
presented to a particular chamber.
The first round at the original chamber starts when the bill is globally analyzed by the
appropriate subject committee, which reports to the chamber. The conclusions contain a
discussion of the bill and whether it is suitable or not as an admissible legislative idea and
potential suggested modifications made by the President or congressmen. Once the debate
finishes, the legislators vote the bill if the constitutional quorum requirement is met. If the
bill is approved with modifications, it is sent again to the subject committee for a new,
more detailed analysis. Once this is done, a second report is presented to the chamber. At
this point, three possible outcomes may occur. (a) The chamber totally approves the bill,
and passes it on to the reviewer chamber; (b) The chamber globally approves, but makes
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modifications to be incorporated to the reviewer chamber’s consideration; or (c) the bill is
totally rejected.
The second legislative round starts once the bill is presented to the reviewer chamber.
Subject committees do an analysis process that is similar to the first round. The reviewer
chamber can approve, modify or reject the bill. In the first case, the bill is sent to the
President for his or her approval. If there are modifications, the bill is sent to the original
chamber for its consideration in a third legislative round. A joint committee of members
of both chambers (comisio´n mixta) is appointed in case the reviewer chamber rejects the
bill in the second round, or if the original chamber rejects the modified bill in the third
round.
In our analysis, we explicitly consider the procedural information to identify the bill’s
proposer at each stage. We also consider that first, second or third legislative round as
well as quorum requirements are determinants of the bill importance index, y. Hence, our
model allows for a proposer who changes the probability of winning according to the bill’s
characteristics.
4.3 Results
We report specifications (1) to (5) in Tables 5 and 6. Our preferred specification is (4)
which includes several Senators’ characteristics to explain the ideological preferences.
Ideological preferences: In order to estimate equation (4), we propose variables that
can account for the ideological stance of the senators, denoted by xv. A natural candidate is
the political party affiliation. We consider the parties with the highest number of Senators
(UDI, RN, PDC, PS, PRSD, PPD, and MAS) and omit dummy variables for non-affiliated
ones (independent). A broad view of the results shows that UDI and RN obtain values
higher than the median voter ideology in Bachelet’s term (normalized at 1). Hence, the
larger the number, the more right-wing oriented. Since specification (5) in Table 5 includes
senator fixed effects, we only report these estimates graphically in Figure 4. The ideological
scale is reversed, but we have turned upside down to ease the interpretation. The overall
estimation of this Senator ideology index of our preferred specification (4) is depicted
in Figure 1. In our online Appendix, the reader can find similar figures for the rest of
specifications. The results show a clear alignment in the left-right cleavage. In Chile, these
poles represent similar ideological positions as in the US and most Western democracies.
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Leftists advocate the liberalization of civic rights and an involved role of the State in the
economy through redistributive policies. Rightists support a conservative view of civic
rights and a limited influence of the State in the economy.
The legislative preferences in Figure 1 show a left-right order during Bachelet’s term
which is roughly consistent with a priori beliefs. Only Espina (RN) and Romero (RN)
are a priori right-wing Senators whose ideological point shows up below the median voter
ideology; Pizarro (PDC) and Sabag (PDC) are center-left Senators appearing with rightist
ideology. There are a large concentration of points around the median voter normalized at
1, the closest being Gomez (PRSD) and Matthei (UDI). In Pin˜era’s term, most of leftists
moved to more central positions, and the median voter’s ideology slightly shifts to the
right. Some new senators in this period seem to have rightist preferences while they are
affiliated to leftists parties (Tuma and Rossi, for instance). Senator Chahua´n (RN) seems
notably escaped to the right. Some Senators from rightist parties appear, in fact, to the
left of the median voter (Matthei, Espina). Again, there are many legislators near the
median voter. The two closest to this point are Allende (PS) and Walker P. (PDC).
For specification (2)-(4) we also considered Senators’ age, age-squared and gender. We
also interacted these variables with the Alianza dummy (Center-right coalition composed
by UDI and RN) in order to capture gender and age-specific patterns of ideological stance.
The results show that Alianza’s male Senators are more right-wing oriented than their
female counterparts. It also appears a milder extremist effect of center-left male Senators,
even though it is not robust in all specifications. The effects of age suggest that the
younger the Senator, the more extreme his/her ideological preferred point is (i.e. rightist
leaning towards right and leftists doing the opposite). Since the quadratic age term has
the opposite sign to the linear age term, the aging moderation process decays for older
Senators.
In the case of specifications (3) and (4) we introduce North and South circumscrip-
tion dummies. Earlier evidence suggests that North4 citizens prefer left-wing candidates,
whereas South5 are right-wing oriented (Villena-Rolda´n 2003). Our evidence suggests that
North Senators are marginally inclined toward the right, which may be explained through a
model of strategic positioning of candidates. The opposite happens to the South Senators.
Prior representative experience has a slight left-wing effect; while international experience
4Tarapaca´, Antofagasta, Copiapo´ and Coquimbo
5Araucan´ıa Norte, Araucan´ıa Sur, Los Rı´os, Los Lagos, Ayse´n and Magallanes
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(former ambassador, etc.) usually exacerbates ideological stance at both sides of the po-
litical spectrum. In the case of Chile this may be partially explained by formerly exiled
left-wing politicians during Pinochet’s dictatorship (1973-1990). Finally, specification (4)
introduces the share of voting in the previous election, which is included squared and in-
teracted with the Alianza dummy. A larger share of voting moves the ideological stance
of Alianza Senators to the right, but at a decreasing rate. In the case of Center-left Sena-
tors, the exacerbating effect seems to be much milder. Last election voting share captures
popularity or reputation that may increase the independency of the senators from partisan
directions.
Proposer ideology: Given the institutional features of the legislative procedure, there
are four main origins for a bill: Executive power, Senate, Representative’s chamber and
joint committees (Comisio´n Mixta). Inasmuch as joint committees are formed by Senators
and Representatives, we restrict the former to have preferences equal to a simple average
between Senate and Representative’s chamber ideological points. Our data restrictions do
not allow us to identify individual proposers of bills in the Senate or in the Representatives’
chamber. However, proposing a particular bill may not be interpreted as a nominally indi-
vidual act, even if there were data about this. In most specifications, Bachelet’s executive
power proposes bills close to the median voter. Indeed, we cannot reject ideology being
equal to the median voter using the bootstrapped confidence intervals for specification (4).
Perhaps surprisingly, Pin˜era’s executive power ideology indicates a slightly more leftist
position than Bachelet’s executive, even tough confidence intervals cover the median voter
position. Our preferred specification (4) shows that both executive powers are very close
to the median voter. This finding is in line with the view of some conservative politician’s
opinions claiming that Pin˜era’s government has not consistently advocated truly rightist
proposals.6 Moreover, the Senate and the Representative Chamber exhibit more rightist
proposals during Bachelet’s terms, even though this difference narrows for the Senate in
our preferred specification. A larger change of Representative’s proposer point may be
accounted by the complete election process in December 2009. While the whole represen-
tative chamber changes, only half of the Senators seats are under electoral dispute. Figure
6For instance, see Senator Novoa’s interview in La Tercera, March 12th 2012. He said “If you look at
the [Pin˜era’s] government accomplishments, you have to make a very favorable balance after two years.
But there is a complicated issue: the government has not made them with a political positioning which is
proper of our side” (translation is ours). A recent book by Novoa “Con la Fuerza de la Libertad” (With
the force of the freedom) also stresses these critiques.
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2 shows the evolution over bills of the median voter, the proposer’s ideology index, the
statu quo index, and the bill proposer index for our preferred specification. The proposer’s
index clearly shifts to the left on average. The statu quo index also shifts to the left. In
this way, the bill ideology index –according to the model a varying weighted average of
median voter and proposer’s ideology– marginally shifts to the left.
Importance Index: The variables in this index y measure the relative importance
given by the proposer to the bill. It can also be interpreted as a relative high value-to-
cost ratio for generating valence. In line to our expectations, absolute quorum or no-
simple quorum requirements increase the index. This, in turn, implies that these bills have
larger approval probability because the proposer cares more about them and is willing to
provide larger valence. The estimates also suggest that first-round voting is more important
that second- or third-round (which appear with negative sign). Finally, particular bills
marginally increase the importance index; voting articles, appointments or agreements
tend to generate negative effects, especially in the last case. The evolution of importance
over time is depicted in Figure 3. This does not show a systematic difference between both
legislative periods.
Statu quo: To estimate equation (4), we determine a set of time varying variables
that represent a sensible measure of the ideological perception of the statu quo. One
natural choice is the President approval percentage that is widely communicated through
the media. Several poll companies generate different indices. We picked the one generated
by Adimark7. We introduce this presidential popularity variable alone and interacting
with a dummy for Pin˜era’s term so that we capture the potentially ideological opposite
effect on the statu quo once a Center-right President is in office. Given the high presidential
power in the Legislative process in Chile, we try to explain the statu quo index by the result
of the previous legislative voting. We interacted this variable with a dummy for Pin˜era’s
term to allow for a reverse effect in this case. We also coded an “current theme” dummy
which subjectively label bill projects in this way.8 Our approach substantially differs from
the traditional Political Science ones, surveyed by Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers (2004).
Those estimates attempt to measure the statu quo as a pure policy location parameter
(e.g. an election fixed effect) with considerable less precision.
In all the specifications, the results show that a higher voting in the Senate for the last
7See in www.adimark.cl
8Exact definition of this variable is available on request.
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bill moves the statu quo to the left during the first period examined, i.e. in favor of the
ideology of President Bachelet. The effect of the previous bill share of voting is less clear
for the second term. At best, a larger support to a bill moves the statu quo to the left
less than it does during Bachelet’s term. On the other hand, the popular approval of the
President tends to move the statu quo to the right, except for the case of specification (5).
Current topics shift the statu quo to the left.9 Considering the results obtained regarding
the ideological stance of proposers during Pin˜era’s term, the result of moving the statu quo
to the left when a bill is approved may not be contradictory at all. Our results suggest that
proposers during Pin˜era’s term are relatively inclined to leftist positions with respect to the
ideology of many Center-right Senators. Some politicians of Bachelet’s government have
recognized they should have implemented certain public policies done in Pin˜era’s term.10
Differential Valence: Figure 3 depicts the differential valence qp  qs computed ac-
cording to equation (2). Our estimates show that the differential valence is negative in
many cases for both periods, especially Pin˜era’s term. It is remarkable that just after
Pin˜era’s took office the differential valence went down for a large magnitude. This may
suggest a certain drop in quality or in ideological consensus during that period. The latter
may be plausible since Pin˜era’s government face particularly difficult circumstances just
after took office. Since it was the first Center-right government after 20 years of Con-
certacio´n was in office, Pin˜era faced some problems to appoint new authorities to run the
government. In addition, Pin˜era had to manage an extraordinary social demand after the
8.8 Richter earthquake in Central Chile on February 27th, 2010. These circumstances may
have diverted government and Congress efforts from the generation of bill quality or con-
sensus due to the emergency, or it may have caused a particularly high cost for generating
valence.
5 Conclusions
We have presented a formal procedure for estimating spatial models of voting by considering
the strategic nature of the ideological setting of the proposals and their associated valence.
9Exact definition of this variable is available on request.
10For instance in an interview in Radio Cooperativa on March 30th, 2010, Francisco Vidal, a former
Secretary under Lagos and Bachelet governments asserted that the Concertacio´n governments were not
brave enough to raise profit tax rates once Pin˜era proposed this to finance reconstruction works after the
earthquake in Central Chile.
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This approach departs in several ways from the previous literature. We formally introduce
a simple theory of strategic agenda setting, considering the configuration of political forces,
institutional arrangements, and the statu quo. The result is a simple model that provides a
characterization of several issues involved in the legislative process, but it is still amenable
for estimation.
On technical grounds, we apply the theory of quantile maximization preferences to
obtain an insightful and estimable non linear probit model. Our results are fairly intu-
itive. The optimal proposer’s strategy is to generate a bill’s ideology which is a weighted
average between her own preferred point and the median voter’s one. We allow for bill
heterogeneity. The more important a bill is, the greater the weight on proposer’s ideology,
and the larger the valence generated. In our view, this theoretical construction proposes a
structural sample selection mechanism of bills that has not been previously addressed by
the literature, to the best of our knowledge. This sample selection mechanism is perva-
sive in many problems in social sciences, especially in Economics since the seminal work
of Heckman (1976). Using the structure of the model, we can learn the evolution of the
ideology of proponents, bill proposals, statu quo, as well as the importance of bills and the
differential valence.
In our empirical application, we use roll-call data from the Chilean Senate from March
2009 to March 2011, covering two legislative terms: the last year of M. Bachelet and the
first year of S. Pin˜era, both with different proposers and a different Senate composition.
We follow the more realistic strategy of Londregan (2000a) consisting of parameterizing
the Senator ideology, the proposers ideology, the statu quo, and the importance of bills,
as linear indices of observable variables. The structure of the model itself corrects the
sample selection problem in contrast to more general, but somewhat impractical empirical
models advocated in this literature (Poole and Rosenthal 1985; Heckman and Snyder Jr
1997; Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers 2004) that try to identify fixed ideological points of
legislators and bills at the same time. Our setup, in contrast, stresses the strategic behavior
of proponents and incorporates it into a simple structurally estimated model.
Our results for Chile show that political party affiliations are an important determinant
of Senator’s ideology. There is evidence of more extremisms in ideological positions for
male, young and highly voted Senators, especially for the Center-right. Despite the fact
that estimating our model with Senator fixed ideological points is feasible as long as one
keeps some parameterization in the statu quo index, the tightly parameterized approach
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(4) is useful because we can learn more on the ideology preference formation. The joint
results for the median voter, the statu quo, and the proposer’s ideology suggest that the
ideological scenario between Bachelet’s and Pin˜era’s periods did not change by much. The
evidence could be interpreted as the way suggested by certain rightists Senators: Pin˜era’s
government has been quite close to the ideological stance of Center-left parties.
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6 Appendix
Table 1: Voting record of Chilean Senate: March 2009-March 2011 (Part 1)
Bachelet’s term Pin˜era’s term
Senador Party Yea Nay Abst Out Match % Yea Yea Nay Abst Out Match % Yea
Arancibia UDI 265 56 5 150 0 55.7
Chadwick UDI 254 45 9 167 1 53.4 162 19 0 210 0 41.4
Coloma UDI 270 54 8 142 2 56.7 245 31 1 114 0 62.7
Larrain H UDI 294 42 13 127 0 61.8 254 19 0 113 5 65.0
Longueira UDI 280 44 3 149 0 58.8 243 36 2 109 1 62.1
Matthei UDI 294 59 11 110 2 61.8 157 20 2 185 8 42.2
Novoa UDI 311 38 14 101 12 65.3 229 38 3 121 0 58.6
Orpis UDI 345 51 6 73 1 72.5 276 37 4 74 0 70.6
Perez V UDI 260 50 8 157 1 54.6 179 32 0 172 8 45.8
Allamand RN 204 40 5 227 0 42.9 170 30 0 170 2 45.7
Chahuan RN 281 33 1 70 6 71.9
Espina RN 183 21 4 266 2 38.4 167 20 3 201 0 42.7
Garcia RN 296 36 18 126 0 62.2 243 21 3 123 1 62.1
Horvath RN 284 30 2 160 0 59.7 285 26 2 72 6 72.9
Kuschel RN 293 63 23 96 1 61.6 258 35 8 89 1 66.0
Perez L RN 211 18 1 157 4 54.0
Prokurica RN 362 51 9 53 1 76.1 299 35 1 53 3 76.5
Romero RN 233 40 17 186 0 48.9
Bianchi IND 361 20 15 80 0 75.8 193 19 6 172 1 49.4
Cantero IND 262 31 10 172 1 55.0 183 17 3 185 3 46.8
Flores IND 166 13 5 292 0 34.9
Mun˜oz R IND 132 25 15 304 0 27.7
Note (a): In January 16th, 2011 several Center-right senators quitted to be appointed as new Secretaries.
Former Senator Matthei undertook the Secretary of Labor Affaires. Former Senator Allamand undertook
the Secretary of Defense. Mr Uriarte and Mr C. Larrain replaced them in the Senate.
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Table 2: Voting record of Chilean Senate: March 2009-March 2011 (Part 2)
Bachelet’s term Pin˜era’s term
Senador Party Yea Nay Abst Out Match % Yea Yea Nay Abst Out Match % Yea
Alvear DC 269 30 4 173 0 56.5 261 24 12 94 0 66.8
Frei DC 174 13 7 282 0 36.6 170 17 5 199 0 43.5
Pizarro DC 215 20 12 228 1 45.2 251 20 10 89 21 64.2
Rincon DC 264 34 16 77 0 67.5
Ruiz-Esquide DC 186 28 9 252 1 39.1 169 29 10 180 3 43.2
Sabag DC 389 34 8 45 0 81.7 242 14 4 122 9 61.9
Walker I DC 178 14 6 176 17 45.5
Walker P DC 260 24 11 92 4 66.5
Zaldivar An DC 223 13 7 114 34 57.0
Zaldivar Ad PRI 169 30 6 271 0 35.5
Allende PS 188 33 7 163 0 48.1
Escalona PS 314 29 5 128 0 66.0 259 26 12 94 0 66.2
Gazmuri PS 281 35 8 152 0 59.0
Letelier PS 235 24 16 201 0 49.4 193 27 17 153 1 49.4
Mun˜oz P PS 325 23 8 120 0 68.3 212 31 8 140 0 54.2
Naranjo PS 243 24 4 205 0 51.1
Nun˜ez PS 281 29 20 146 0 59.0
Ominami PS 163 35 24 254 0 34.2
Rossi PS 132 17 6 235 1 33.8
Avila PPD 182 23 24 247 0 38.2
Girardi PPD 201 34 26 215 0 42.2 152 14 12 213 0 38.9
Lagos PPD 216 17 12 129 17 55.2
Quintana PPD 244 32 22 93 0 62.4
Tuma PPD 217 22 12 111 29 55.5
Gomez PRSD 241 35 14 186 0 50.6 233 30 10 108 10 59.6
Vasquez PRSD 262 16 5 190 3 55.0
Navarro MAS 157 40 28 250 1 33.0 198 51 11 130 1 50.6
Notes: UDI = Unio´n Demo´crata Independiente (Democratic Union Party) ; RN = Renovacio´n Nacional
(National Renovation) ; PDC = Partido Demo´crata Cristiano (Democratic Christian Party); PS = Partido
Socialista (Socialist Party); PPD= Partido por la Democracia (Party for the Democracy); PRSD = Partido
Radical Social Demo´crata (Social Democratic - Radical Party) ; MAS = Movimiento Amplio Social (Wide
Social Movement); IND = Independientes (No party affiliation).
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Table 3: Senators individual characteristics (Part 1)
Senator Party Circuns Sex Age Educ Year elec Vot Position Exper Bachelet Pin˜era
Arancibia UDI Valparaiso Costa M 71 Grad 2001 38.4 2 N Y N
Chadwick(a) UDI O’Higgins M 54 Coll 2005 25.4 2 N Y Y
Coloma UDI Maule Norte M 54 Coll 2009 35.2 1 N Y Y
Larrain H UDI Maule Sur M 63 Grad 2009 43.1 1 Y Y Y
Longueira UDI RM Oriente M 52 Coll 2005 24.0 2 N Y Y
Matthei UDI Coquimbo F 57 Grad 2005 28.5 2 N Y Y
Novoa UDI RM Poniente M 65 Coll 2005 20.8 3 Y Y Y
Orpis UDI Arica - Tarapac M 54 Grad 2009 33.5 1 N Y Y
Pe´rez V UDI Biobio Interior M 56 Coll 2005 23.4 2 N Y Y
Allamand(a) RN de los Rios M 53 Coll 2005 37.9 1 N Y Y
Chahua´n RN Valparaiso Costa M 39 Post 2009 28.3 2 N N Y
Espina RN Araucania Norte M 54 Coll 2009 38.5 1 N Y Y
Garcia RN Araucania Sur M 55 Post 2009 22.5 2 N Y Y
Horvath RN Aysen M 60 Grad 2009 34.6 1 N Y Y
Kuschel RN de los Lagos M 57 Grad 2005 20.7 3 N Y Y
Pe´rez L RN Valparaiso Interior F 47 Post 2009 23.0 1 N N Y
Prokurica RN Atacama M 52 Coll 2009 33.0 1 N Y Y
Romero RN Valparaiso Interior M 72 Coll 2001 39.7 1 Y Y N
Bianchi IND Magallanes M 50 Coll inc 2005 27.7 2 N Y Y
Cantero IND Antofagasta M 54 Grad 2005 19.4 2 N Y Y
Flores IND Arica - Tarapac M 67 Grad 2001 30.5 1 N Y N
Mun˜oz R IND Araucania Norte M 74 Coll 2001 27.1 2 N Y N
Notes: UDI = Unio´n Demo´crata Independiente (Democratic Union Party) ; RN = Renovacio´n Nacional (National Renovation) ; IND = Independientes (No party
affiliation). In January 16th, 2011 four Center-right senators (Allamand, Chadwick, Longueira, and Matthei) quitted to be appointed as new Secretaries.
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Table 4: Senators individual characteristics (Part 2)
Senator Party Circuns Sex Age Educ Year elec Vot Position Exper Bachelet Pin˜era
Alvear PDC RM Oriente F 60 2deg 2005 43.8 1 N Y Y
Frei PDC de los Rios M 68 Post 2005 35.9 2 Y Y Y
Pizarro PDC Coquimbo M 58 Coll 2005 40.4 1 Y Y Y
Rinco´n PDC Maule Sur F 42 Coll 2009 31.0 2 N N Y
Ruiz-Esquide PDC Biobio Interior M 80 Grad 2005 39.3 1 N Y Y
Sabag PDC Biobio Costa M 73 Coll inc 2005 25.6 2 N Y Y
Walker I PDC Valparaiso Interior M 54 Grad 2009 21.1 2 N N Y
Walker P PDC Aysen M 41 Coll 2009 27.6 2 N N Y
Zald´ıvar An PDC Maule Norte M 74 Coll 2009 31.4 2 Y N Y
Zald´ıvar Ad PRI Aysen M 67 Coll 2001 30.2 2 Y Y N
Allende PS Atacama F 65 Post 2009 26.8 2 N N Y
Escalona PS de los Lagos M 55 2deg 2005 28.7 1 N Y Y
Gazmuri PS Maule Norte M 66 Coll 2001 30.5 2 Y Y N
Letelier PS O’Higgins M 49 Grad 2005 41.5 1 N Y Y
Mun˜oz P PS Magallanes M 66 Coll 2005 33.3 1 N Y Y
Naranjo PS Maule Sur M 59 Grad 2001 28.1 1 N Y N
Nu´n˜ez PS Atacama M 71 Grad 2001 43.0 1 Y Y N
Ominami PS Valparaiso Interior M 60 Grad 2001 28.7 2 Y Y N
Rossi PS Arica - Tarapac M 40 Coll 2009 27.1 3 N N Y
A´vila PPD Valparaiso Costa M 68 Grad 2001 38.5 1 N Y N
Girardi PPD RM Poniente M 49 Grad 2005 35.3 1 N Y Y
Lagos PPD Valparaiso Costa M 48 Grad 2009 33.2 1 N N Y
Quintana PPD Araucania Norte M 43 Coll 2009 29.6 2 N N Y
Tuma PPD Araucania Sur M 65 Coll 2009 29.1 1 N N Y
Go´mez PRSD Antofagasta M 57 Post 2005 40.2 1 N Y Y
Va´squez PRSD Araucania Sur M 68 Coll 2005 4.2 0 N Y N
Navarro MAS Biobio Costa M 52 Coll 2005 42.0 1 N Y Y
Notes: PDC = Partido Demo´crata Cristiano (Democratic Christian Party); PS = Partido Socialista (Socialist Party); PPD= Partido por la Democracia (Party for
the Democracy); PRSD = Partido Radical Social Demo´crata (Social Democrat Radical Party) ; MAS = Movimiento Amplio Social (Wide Social Movement). In 2005,
Senator Va´squez, who got the second place for the Concertacio´n list in 2001 election, substituted Senator Lavandero when he was accused and incarcerated for child
abusing.
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Table 5: Estimated Models, Bootstrapped Results (Part 1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
xv: Senator’s ideology
UDI 1.916 2.729 3.532 2.470
[1.818/2.015] [2.184/3.310] [2.769/4.397] [1.652/3.383]
RN 2.164 2.686 3.471 2.458
[2.063/2.268] [2.163/3.254] [2.736/4.303] [1.675/3.353]
PDC 1.793 0.175 0.265 0.389
[1.672/1.908] [0.133/0.223] [0.208/0.331] [0.317/0.482]
PS 1.716 0.130 0.304 0.432
[1.600/1.839] [0.094/0.169] [0.240/0.383] [0.349/0.527]
PPD 1.147 7.78E-4 0.189 0.339
[0.987/1.304] [-0.036/0.037] [0.139/0.249] [0.270/0.430]
PRSD 1.813 0.153 0.104 0.130
[1.609/2.016] [0.104/0.213] [0.059/0.160] [0.069/0.198]
MAS 1.082 -0.178 -0.161 0.032
[0.760/1.401] [-0.239/-0.125] [-0.233/-0.102] [-0.050/0.121]
Male -0.047 0.019 -0.005
[-0.092/-0.009] [-0.026/0.063] [-0.060/0.044]
Male x Alianza 0.177 0.193 0.297
[0.118/0.245] [0.123/0.269] [0.216/0.391]
Age 0.044 0.040 0.045
[0.041/0.047] [0.038/0.043] [0.041/0.050]
Age2/10 -3.83E-4 -3.39E-4 -3.80E-4
[-4.17E-4/-3.55E-4] [-3.69E-4/-3.15E-4] [-4.24E-4/-3.43E-4]
Age x Alianza -0.087 -0.109 -0.108
[-0.106/-0.069] [-0.136/-0.085] [-0.139/-0.083]
Age2 /10 x Alianza 6.82E-4 8.16E-4 7.93E-4
[5.50E-4/8.36E-4] [6.32E-4/0.001] [5.90E-4/0.001]
North 0.056 0.076
[0.032/0.086] [0.048/0.110]
South -0.014 -0.037
[-0.040/0.011] [-0.068/-0.008]
Repr exp -0.035 -0.094
[-0.065/-0.010] [-0.130/-0.064]
Internac exp -0.233 -0.271
[-0.290/-0.185] [-0.333/-0.221]
Internac exp x Alianza 0.378 0.428
[0.303/0.468] [0.348/0.523]
share voting 1.27E-4
[-0.007/0.008]
(share voting)2 -1.79E-4
[-3.31E-4/-4.28E-5]
share voting x Alianza 0.068
[0.049/0.088]
(share voting)2 x Alianza -9.71E-4
[-0.001/-6.81E-4]
Coefficient reported is the bootstrapped average coefficient with 1000 repetitions. 95% bootstrapped confidence interval in
brackets. 27
Table 6: Estimated Models, Bootstrapped Results (Part 2)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
xi: Proposer’s ideology
Executive Bachelet 0.694 1.676 1.253 0.931 -0.634
[0.549/0.851] [0.878/2.632] [0.542/2.079] [0.302/1.610] [-0.826/-0.446]
Executive Pin˜era 0.522 0.610 0.913 0.956 -0.116
[0.323/0.731] [-0.011/1.325] [0.297/1.617] [0.381/1.650] [-0.276/0.031]
Senate Bachelet 0.590 0.691 0.284 0.317 -0.466
[0.430/0.751] [0.009/1.439] [-0.377/0.997] [-0.307/0.947] [-0.638/-0.279]
Senate Pin˜era 0.196 -0.368 -0.038 0.173 0.105
[0.100/0.288] [-0.773/-0.016] [-0.413/0.305] [-0.173/0.512] [0.021/0.192]
Repres Bachelet 0.734 2.850 2.113 1.659 -0.870
[0.583/0.887] [1.864/4.049] [1.239/3.122] [0.884/2.474] [-1.091/-0.658]
Repres Pin˜era 0.309 0.569 0.612 0.647 -0.015
[0.185/0.434] [0.198/0.956] [0.252/1.009] [0.318/0.981] [-0.106/0.076]
y: Bill importance index
Type: Article -0.004 -0.026 -0.048 -0.051 -0.063
[-0.028/0.021] [-0.050/-0.003] [-0.073/-0.023] [-0.077/-0.026] [-0.079/-0.049]
Type: Particular 0.104 0.053 0.038 0.037 0.014
[0.072/0.138] [0.026/0.081] [0.009/0.067] [0.007/0.067] [-0.005/0.033]
Type: Agreement -0.405 -0.424 -0.458 -0.459 -0.280
[-0.441/-0.369] [-0.464/-0.384] [-0.498/-0.420] [-0.498/-0.423] [-0.301/-0.260]
Type: Appointment -0.009 -0.084 -0.101 -0.097 -0.093
[-0.073/0.056] [-0.141/-0.024] [-0.161/-0.040] [-0.158/-0.031] [-0.130/-0.055]
Second round -0.005 -0.192 -0.173 -0.142 -0.117
[-0.030/0.020] [-0.232/-0.148] [-0.218/-0.124] [-0.198/-0.078] [-0.145/-0.088]
Third round -0.164 -0.307 -0.284 -0.253 -0.183
[-0.219/-0.105] [-0.360/-0.252] [-0.340/-0.223] [-0.314/-0.182] [-0.217/-0.147]
Absolute quorum 0.118 0.126 0.125 0.140 0.166
[-0.057/0.308] [-0.031/0.291] [-0.032/0.295] [-0.024/0.312] [0.062/0.273]
No simple quorum 0.268 0.208 0.206 0.214 0.119
[0.247/0.289] [0.186/0.233] [0.184/0.230] [0.190/0.239] [0.106/0.134]
z: Statu Quo ideological index
Last voting -0.402 -1.499 -1.326 -1.112 0.400
[-0.481/-0.321] [-1.882/-1.141] [-1.725/-0.985] [-1.417/-0.849] [0.335/0.466]
Last voting x Pin˜era 0.043 0.097 -0.042 -0.242 -0.120
[-0.064/0.143] [-0.232/0.425] [-0.357/0.279] [-0.541/0.042] [-0.194/-0.044]
Aprob Gob 1.051 0.136 0.165 0.404 1.219
[0.940/1.167] [-0.219/0.493] [-0.187/0.492] [0.080/0.705] [1.124/1.312]
Aprob Gob x Pin˜era 0.133 1.558 1.061 0.672 -0.701
[-0.016/0.281] [0.945/2.264] [0.513/1.680] [0.193/1.162] [-0.834/-0.570]
Current -0.011 0.025 0.035 0.031 7.36E-4
[-0.050/0.027] [-0.078/0.127] [-0.057/0.129] [-0.057/0.120] [-0.022/0.023]
Highly popular 0.095 0.281 0.274 0.259 -0.066
[0.060/0.132] [0.178/0.396] [0.165/0.392] [0.162/0.363] [-0.089/-0.042]
Coefficient reported is the bootstrapped average coefficient with 1000 repetitions. 95% bootstrapped confidence interval in
brackets. 28
Figure 1: Legislator ideological indices, Model 4
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Panel A: Bachelet’s term
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Panel B: Piñera’s term
Notes: Grey area represents 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals (see details on text)
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Figure 2: Median, Proposer, Statu quo, and Bill ideological indices, Model 4
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Figure 3: Importance and valence indices, Model 4
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Figure 4: Legislator ideological indices, Model 5
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Panel B: Piñera’s term
Notes: Grey area represents 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals (see details on text)
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